Book Review: No Country for Old Men and The Road

No Country for Old Men (2005) and The Road (2006) by Cormac McCarthy.

This review has some spoilers for both stories, but not too bad. I wrote it quite a while ago and am posting it to end the embarrassing lack of posting. The review is okay, but I have since read Blood Meridian and have some new thoughts. I'll try to write a review of Meridian soon and comment on how I think No Country and The Road relate.

Considered one of the great American writers of our time, Cormac McCarthy’s two most recent novels seem to occur in the same world with only an apocalypse between them. No Country is set in a small town in the south in the 1980s. The main character and partial narrator is Sheriff Ed Tom Bell, who is the kind of man you want to be your sheriff. He comes from a family of lawmen and knows the job’s risks and the job’s duties. The other two major characters seem to share a set of principles that are opposed to our lawman’s – they will take what is not theirs in order to get ahead, be it money or life. Yet, somehow, one of these characters is obviously a good guy and the other a villain.

The Road has far fewer characters and far less dialogue than No Country. About ten years post apocalypse, we are introduced to a man and his son as they attempt to survive on their journey, or maybe as they are on their journey to survive. Winter is coming, there is no food and their fellow men are more likely to kill them than assist them. One of their few possessions is a pistol with two rounds. This is not enough to survive a gang attack, but it is exactly the number needed to not endure such an attack. It is hard to explain the intensity of this book, one reviewer said, “it is as if you must keep reading in order for the characters to stay alive.” McCarthy’s prose is as sparse as the landscape, accenting the urgency of each moment.

No Country has been called nihilistic, but it seems more accurate to say it is asking a nihilistic question - is there anything worth valuing left in this world? At one point, Bell has a conversation with another sheriff about the recent events, which have been a series of brutal killings, sometimes in mass. The sheriff talks of the “dismal tide” which has been coming, and these events are “signs and wonders” of what is in store. In the end of the book, McCarthy does not answer this question but offers a vision. Bell dreams of his late father carrying fire into the darkness ahead of him, where they will eventually meet.

The darkness has descended in The Road, and the father and son’s journey is not without purpose. They are “carrying the fire,” and hope to find others doing likewise. They will not become cannibals to survive, because they are carrying the fire. Together, their hope, or maybe the fire, or maybe they are the same, keep them walking down the road. Sheriff Bell gives up fighting for a world he no longer understands – things have changed too much, but he doesn’t lose all hope. The pretense of civilization no longer masks the dismal tide in The Road, it has come, but it has not put out the fire. And maybe the fire will win in the end, and old and young can enjoy it together.

Virtue Epistemology

The works cited are at the end.
On the internalism/ externalism slide, there is a mistake. "Standard" and "Non-standard" should be switched.
I have some notes that go with the presentation but don't show up here. Email me if you want them.

Response to Grisez: Conclusion.

My bad for not posting this a lot sooner. For the sake of completing the series, here is the conclusion from my paper.
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We have examined two different arguments against Thomas’s view of ultimate end offered by Germain Grisez. The first argument fails due to the essential-accidental distinction in happiness. In order to understand the context of Grisez’s argument we looked at the treatise on happiness. After a careful construction of Aquinas’s view, we saw that he already had a distinction in place that answered Grisez’s objection – the difference between desiring(2a) and wishing. Three reasons were offered to show this distinction was not ad hoc, giving added strength to Thomas’s answer. Finally, an objection was offered against the distinction – that in order to significantly will, one must desire(2a). God’s willing of creation provided a sufficient counterexample to this objection, and reinforced that it is not incompatible to will perfections according to well-being even when the essence of happiness is fulfilled.

I consider the arguments as Grisez presented them sufficiently answered. In order to rebut, Grisez will need to offer an alternative anthropology and psychology of action. His objections assumed a overly simplified view of desire and willing that prevented him from dealing with distinctions Thomas has in place for good reasons. These distinctions are not created to answer Grisez’s second argument, but are the result of a robust anthropology, phenomenology of action and theology proper. The cohesiveness and depth of these elements of Thomas’s system must be dealt with if Thomas’s view of ultimate end is to be refuted.

Response to Grisez's Second Argument: Part 3.

Response to (2c)

We have seen how Thomas understands (2a) and that he accepts (2b) – separated souls enjoying the beatific have potential to receive perfections according to their well-being. But what does he think of (2c), the potential to receive perfection according to well-being is sufficient for desire? If (2c) holds, then Grisez’s argument is successful and Thomas’s view of ultimate end needs to be rejected. So Thomas must reject this principle in order to maintain his view of ultimate end.

Thomas indirectly does this in the last two objections and replies of question four article five. We will look at these in some detail and then explain how to understand Thomas’s rejection of (2c). Objection four argues from authority that the disembodied soul will be hindered in its activity, which is incompatible with beatitude. Thomas first appeals to Aristotle’s teaching that the activity of happiness is unhindered and then to Augustine’s teaching that the soul has a natural appetite for ruling the body and is held back from its attainment of the good without the body. Thus, the disembodied soul cannot be happy.

Thomas replies by making a distinction in how something can be hindered. One thing can hinder another as a contrary, and this is opposed to happiness. But one can thing can also hinder another as a deficiency, “and this is not opposed to its happiness, but to its completion on every count.” (I-II.4.5.ad 4) So the soul cannot “press on with all its might” to the vision of God, in that it wants its delight to overflow into the body. Thomas cryptically concludes, “And therefore so long as the soul enjoys God without its partner, its desire (appetitus), though at rest with what it has, still longs (vellet) for the body to enter in and share.” (I-II.4.5.ad 4) If Thomas thought just any kind of desire or longing at all was incompatible with the ultimate end satiating all desire, then this passage would contain an obvious contradiction. Clearly, Thomas thought that the soul at rest in God was not incompatible some kind of desire. And just as clearly, this remainder longing cannot be the kind of desire that our ultimate end completely fulfills.

The fifth objection is a perfect successor to these claims regarding the soul’s desires. He objects that happiness leaves nothing left to be desired (desiderium). But the disembodied soul still desires (appetit) being united to the body. Thus, the disembodied soul cannot be happy. The similarity between this and Grisez’s argument is unmistakable.

Aquinas replies that the desire (desiderium) of the separated soul is completely at rest on the part of the object desired (appetibilis). This is because, as Thomas has already argued, it has what contents it. “But it is not wholly at rest, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish (vellet) to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.”(I-II.4.5.ad 5) This reply makes a distinction between being satisfied in your proper object and wholly at rest. But what is the difference between desire in the sense of (2a) and the wishing Thomas has spoken of in these two replies?

Another passage we have looked at will help make this clear. “Since the good is the object of the will (voluntatis), the perfect good is that which satisfies it altogether. To desire (appetere) to be happy is nothing else than to wish (apetere) for this satisfaction.” (I-II.5.8) Now we can properly qualify and distinguish the desires Thomas is speaking of in order to evaluate Grisez’s argument. The desire of the rational appetite that is fulfilled by the ultimate end such that no desires are left is the one Thomas speaks of in this last passage. It is the desire for the fulfillment and satiation of the will. We will designate this species of desire as desire(2a). It is fulfilled in the intellectual vision of God. But there is also a desire, which Thomas calls wishing (vellet) in his replies to the relevant objections. This is a motion of the will, but not one due to a need or longing for satisfaction.

The essence of its satisfaction complete, the will is not entirely at rest on the side of the subject, but it is completely at rest in its object. It still moves towards goods (e.g., ruling the body, company of friends), but not in such a way as to be looking for rest and fulfillment. It is somewhat counterintuitive to speak of the will moving in this way, and one might object that this distinction is ad hoc. Three arguments show that this first objection is not successful.

First, it is not merely added on to save the theory. Instead, it is a distinction that flows from the theory. Now, one might offer arguments against Thomas’s conclusion – I will offer one in a moment – but it is a conclusion from his premises. If the ultimate end is the intellectual vision of God and this satisfies all of our desire(2a), then there will be remaining goods that are perfective of us. This is what the distinction in perfection between essence and well-being recognizes. If there are goods that are perfective of us in an accidental way, then it is fitting that there would be some mode of desire that moves toward these goods.

Second, it is phenomenologically explanatory. Revisiting the symphony analogy, it fits with such experiences to have your desire(2a) at rest but to still have wishes. Although in some way I was willing to have my legs stretched and thirst quenched, my sense appetites were at rest, enjoying the music. In this way, my remaining desires were not for some added fulfillment for I was satisfied in the music. Thus we have somewhat analogous experiences that fit with the distinction between desiring and wishing.

Third, it is fitting with Thomas’ s view of resting will. Thomas thinks that the delight in possession and resting in the good is an act of the will. (I-II.11.1) So it is not the case that Thomas holds when a good is attained and we rest in it, our will is somehow done acting. Instead, the act of enjoyment is the fruition of the will’s action. Just as the perfection of the intellect is the act of vision, so the perfection of the will is the act of delight. If resting in the good is not thought of as inaction, then a resting will that is also wishing is less counterintuitive. These three reasons support that the desire/wish distinction is not an ad hoc distinction.

It might also be objected – an objection that I think Grisez makes – that if a will is wishing or acting, then it is desiring(2a). In an earlier objection to Thomas Grisez argues that the ultimate end cannot satisfy all desires because the saints in heaven sincerely ask for things in prayer. “But one cannot sincerely ask for anything without desiring it.” On our understanding, “wishing” does not seem significantly weaker than “sincerely asking.” So wishing would also be sufficient for desiring. Really, it seems that any significant act of will must be a desire in Grisez’s psychology. In order for his argument regarding prayer to work, desiring must mean desiring(2a). Thus wishing is sufficient for desiring(2a), and Thomas’s distinction breaks down.

The problem with this argument – that in order to will significantly one must desire(2a) something as something that will satisfy it – is that there is a glaring counterexample. God wills creation. But certainly God does not desire(2a) creation. How can God have such movement of will without having desire(2a)? Thomas explains that the proper object of the divine will is the divine goodness, and God wills “things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end.” (I.19.3) One wills things necessarily if they are required for the end, but this does not pertain to God’s willing for his goodness is fully perfect apart from anything else. Thus, the willing of things outside of his own goodness is for the sake of the things willed, so that they may partake in the divine goodness. (I.19.2) Likewise, the perfections according to the well-being of happiness are not willed in order to fulfill an unsatisfied desire, but so the body and friends may be partakers in beatitude. Thus wishing is not sufficient for desiring(2a) and the objection fails to defeat Thomas’s answer to Grisez.

Response to Grisez's Second Argument: Part 2.

The Nature and Object of the Will

The appetitive powers are distinct from other powers because they have a unique object, the good. (I.80.1.ad 2) Sensitive appetites pursue goods that are pleasing to the senses (I.81.2), which are concrete particulars. Distinguishing the rational appetite is its object of universal or immaterial goods. (I.81.2.ad 2) Thomas also explains that the object of the will is the good understood. (I.82.4) This is because the good apprehended by the will must first be truth apprehended by the intellect. The will is the rational appetite and so its objects are presented to it by the intellect. (I.80.2, I-II.3.4) So, every thing that can be understood to be good is desired by the will under that form. The will then finds partial delight or rest in finite things, but still desires to be fully complete and resting. “But rest is not utter and complete except in our ultimate end; so long as something more is expected the will’s motion still remains in suspense despite its advance.” (I-II.11.3) And the only thing that can fulfill the will’s “expectations” is the intellectual vision of God.

The will’s object is the good without reserve and so cannot be satisfied with any limited good. (I-II.2.8) “Now by seeing God just as he is, the soul is filled with every good; the vision unites us with the source of all goodness.” (I-II.5.4) This takes us all the way back to Thomas’s treatise on God. After demonstrating that God is good, Thomas replies to the objection that good is that which all things desire, but some things do not desire God, “All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being.” (I.6.1.ad2) Thus, in the intellectual vision of God, the will enjoys every good by enjoying goodness itself.

If Thomas is correct about the nature of the will and its object, then he is correct that the rational appetite is completely satiated by the beatific vision. The will has attained its object and rests in it. It follows that any other good would be accidental to happiness and could not offer the will any more fulfillment than it already enjoys. With this understanding of Thomas’s view of (2a), the will and its object, we will turn to (2c).
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i. Thomas Aquinas, Psychology of Human Acts, vol. 17 (I.II.6-17) of Summa Theologiæ, trans. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (1968, repr., USA: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
ii. English Dominican translation.

Response to Grisez's Second Argument: Part 1.

Response to principle (2a)

Grisez takes his first premise, (2a) the ultimate end leaves nothing more to be desired, directly from Thomas.i Grisez references question one, article five of the treatise on happiness to support his claim that Thomas holds this principle. Throughout the rest of his article, Grisez then treats this principle without qualifying what is meant by desire. As Grisez presents the principle, “Thomas argues that it is necessary that human beings’ ultimate end so fulfill their whole desire (appetitum) that nothing more remains to be desired.”ii Without any qualifications, it would appear that if any objects of appetitum remain unattained, then desire remains. But desire is not a flat or shallow concept for Aquinas, and happiness is not essentially a fulfillment of desire simpliciter.

Near the end of the treatise on man in the first part of the Summa, Thomas discusses the class of appetitive powers. (I.80) In the second article he asks Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers? From a consideration of the need for a mover (the apprehended object) to fit the moved (the appetite), Thomas concludes that they are in fact distinct powers. Since goodness is grasped and desirable not just in concrete particulars (the object of sense) but in general and immaterial perfections, the intellectual appetite must be distinct from the sensitive (I.81.2.ad 2). The question remains, When Thomas speaks of appetite and desire in the treatise on happiness, to what is he referring?

A survey of his usage of (2a) will answer this question. Grisez references the first use of (2a) in the treatise, where Thomas does not qualify the desiring appetite. This lack of qualification is not surprising, given its place in the treatise. Thomas’s method is often to begin with the general and then to specify through argument. Thus it will be instructive for us to visit his subsequent uses of (2a).

The second appearance of (2a) occurs in question two. In article seven, Thomas asks Whether man’s happiness lies in a good quality of the soul? Arguing that on the side of the thing possessed our ultimate end cannot be in a quality of the soul, Thomas says, “For the good which is the ultimate end is complete and fulfills desire (appetitum). Human desire (appetites autem humanus) or will (voluntas) is for unrestricted good, whereas a psychological entity is a derivative and therefore a particular good.” (I-II.2.7) Clearly, Thomas thinks that the ultimate end fulfills our will, which Thomas calls the rational appetite (I-II.1.2) Again, in the next article, Thomas uses (2a) to argue against a created good being our ultimate end. And again, Thomas clearly considers the desire being fulfilled the rational appetite,

For man to rest content with any created good is not possible, for he can be happy only with complete good which satisfies his desire (appetitum) altogether: he would not have reached his ultimate end were there something still remaining to be desired (appetendum). The object of the will (voluntatus), that is the human appetite (appetites humanus), is the Good without reserve, just as the object of the mind is the True without reserve. Clearly, then, nothing can satisfy man’s will (voluntatem) except such goodness, which is found, not in anything created, but in God alone. (I-II.2.8)

Thomas considers the ultimate end to be the fulfillment of the human appetite or will.

Following this are two uses of (2a) where Thomas does not qualify the appetite as the rational appetite. In I-II.3.8 Thomas argues that complete happiness can only lie in the vision of God. Since through God’s effects, we know that He is but cannot grasp the cause, we will desire to grasp this cause until we have the vision of God. But, “man is not perfectly happy so long as something remains for him to desire and seek (desiderandum et quærendum).” Thus, only with the vision of God can man be perfectly happy.

Thomas next uses (2a) to argue that happiness cannot be attained in this life. We are subject to many different evils in this life and cannot fulfill our desire to guarantee the security of any happiness we do attain. But, “the general notion of happiness, of goodness perfect and sufficient, implies that every ill is banished and every desire (desiderium) fulfilled.” (I-II.5.3) Thus, beatitude cannot be attained in this life.

The last use of (2a) occurs in the last article of the treatise. Thomas asks Whether every human being desires (appetat) happiness? He answers that when beatitude is taken in its general or abstract meaning, everybody wishes (vult) for happiness. “For it signifies, as we have said, complete goodness. Since the good is the object of the will (voluntatis), the perfect good is that which satisfies it altogether. To desire (appetere) to be happy is nothing else than to wish (apetere) for this satisfaction. And each and everyone wishes.” (I-II.5.8) The complete goodness that satisfies our desire is taken to be the object that satisfies our will or rational appetite. Together, these passages offer strong support that when Thomas speaks of the ultimate end satisfying man’s desire, he is speaking primarily of our rational appetite.

Two further arguments can be offered for this conclusion. First, that Thomas considers beatitude to lie in the intellectual vision of God, an activity that does not depend on the body. Without the body there is no sensitive appetite. Thus, the appetite being satisfied (at least primarily) is the rational appetite.

Second, Thomas argues that sensitive activity does not enter into the essence of happiness. The union that is the essence of happiness cannot be achieved on the sense level. But sensitive activity does enter into beatitude as an antecedent and a consequent. Insofar as we enjoy happiness in this life, sensation is a prerequisite for understanding and so an antecedent to happiness. Sensitive activity is a consequent to beatitude in that when the soul is reembodied, its delight will overflow into the body, enhancing its activities (I-II.3.3). Yet this is an accidental perfection to happiness, or a perfection according to the well-being of happiness. The essence of happiness is therefore not affected by the body’s absence, allowing the disembodied soul to attain the essence of happiness. Thus it is possible that sensitive appetites not be completely fulfilled without happiness being lost, for the sensitive appetites are not even present in the disembodied person.

In conclusion, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that when Thomas uses (2a) he is speaking of the fulfillment of the rational appetite and not desire in general, although these other appetites do enter into happiness. Thus, for the essence of happiness to be complete, it is sufficient for the rational appetite to be at rest in its object. The next section will show that, according to Thomas’s anthropology and theology, the rational appetite is at rest in its object in the beatific vision.
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i.For the sake of simplicity, I will use (2a) to refer to “the ultimate end leaves nothing more to be desired” instead of the original formulation “According to Thomas, the ultimate end leaves nothing more to be desire,” while looking at Thomas.
ii.Grisez, 39.

Response to Grisez's First Objection

An evaluation of the first argument must begin with a proper understanding of (1a) “According to Thomas, beatitude is perfect fulfillment.” Grisez ignores an important question, Perfect fulfillment of what? Grisez references I-II.1.7 for support where Thomas claims beatitude is perfect fulfillment.ⁱ This article asks Is there one ultimate end for all human beings? In the response, Aquinas answers, “all desire (appetitu) their complete fulfillment, which, as we have noted, is what final end means.” (I-II.1.7) As we have seen, Thomas explains in what our complete fulfillment lies. He is clear that he does not understand “complete fulfillment” to mean that the human being receives every perfection. Rather, he distinguishes what is essential to happiness from what is not, leaving the latter out of what constitutes our ultimate end. Instead, the essence of human happiness is when our highest power is engaged with its highest object. This is found in the intellectual vision of God. So if Thomas thinks our ultimate end is completely fulfilling and that the essence of beatitude lies in the intellectual vision, then he does not think that “complete fulfillment” refers to anything like being perfectly actualized in every potency.

Premise (1d), fulfillment that already is perfect cannot be further perfected, is now the crucial premise. It is true that if a being or capacity is completely actualized or perfected, then it can receive no further perfection in the same respect. But certainly a being that is perfect in one respect can be perfected in another. Thomas thinks that the ultimate end is a complete perfection of the essence of happiness. So Thomas does not violate (1d) as long as he does not claim that other things further contribute to the essence of happiness. And this is exactly what his distinction between types of perfection accomplishes. The added perfections of the resurrection and company of friends are not essential perfections of happiness. Therefore, Grisez’s first argument against Thomas fails, for it fails to recognize the essential-accidental distinction within happiness.

An analogous example will help clarify the point. Recently I attended a cramped chamber orchestra performance of Beethoven’s Violin Concerto. Thirsty and uncomfortable, I was very aware of physical comfort before the orchestra began. But the music completely captured my attention when it started. It is possible to think about the fulfillment of one’s sensible appetites, and in a way, the enrapturing music was the complete fulfillment of the essence of my sensible happiness. While perfections of comfort could have been added to this fulfillment, they would not be constitutive of my enjoyment. My sensible happiness was, in a way, complete, and the other perfections were relegated to accidents.ⁱⁱ

The natural rebuttal to Thomas’s understanding is that although his view of complete fulfillment according to the essence of happiness is compatible with the resurrection and company of friends being accidental, without those things happiness does not seem truly complete because they are so desirable. And this is very near Grisez’s second argument.

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i Grisez, 39.

ii The symphony illustration of essential and accidental happiness is borrowed from Dr. Thomas D’Andrea.