Meaning: what is the semantic function of moral discourse? Is the function of moral discourse to state facts, or does it have some other non fact-stating role?
Metaphysics: Do moral facts (or properties) exist? If so, what are they like? Are they identical or reducible to some other type of fact (or property) or are they irreducible and sui generis?
Epistemology and justification: is there such a thing as moral knowledge? How can we know whether our moral judgments are true or false? How can we ever justify our claims to moral knowledge?
Phenomenology: how are moral qualities represented in the experience of an agent making a moral judgment? Do they appear to be ‘out there’ in the world?
Moral Psychology: what can we say about the motivational state of someone making a moral judgment? What sort of connection is there between making a moral judgment and being motivated to act as that judgment prescribes?
Objectivity: can moral judgments really be correct or incorrect? Can we work towards finding out the moral truth? (2)
At the end of the introduction Miller provides a great flow chart explaining the different positions in metaethics. I’ll try to go back to it and reproduce it one of these days.
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