Germain Grisez's Objection to Aquinas's view of Ultimate End

In article five of question four, Thomas asks Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness? He answers no but explains that the body can enter into happiness. Aquinas explains,

Note, however, that something may be part of a thing’s perfection in two ways. First, as constituting its nature; thus soul is part of man’s perfection. Secondly, as required for its full development; thus good looks and swift wit are parts of his perfection.

Now the body enters into happiness in the second way, not in the first. For since a thing’s activity depends on its nature, the more perfect its condition so much the more perfectly will the soul enjoy its characteristic activity, in which happiness lies. Accordingly, after inquiring whether sovereign happiness can be granted to the spirits of the dead, Augustine answers that they cannot see the eternal substance as the holy angles do, either for some hidden reason or because they naturally yearn to work with the body. (I-II.4.5)ⁱ

This distinction between perfection according to essence and well-being is the basis Grisez’s objection. In addition to classifying the body under the second kind of perfecting, Thomas also locates the company of friends this category. (I-II.4.8) Grisez objects that this distinction is incompatible with Thomas’s view of ultimate end and offers four arguments to support this, of which we will consider the first two.ⁱⁱ

Argument 1: Perfection Cannot be Perfected

The conclusion of this argument is that given Thomas’s view of ultimate end as complete fulfillment, he cannot coherently hold that further perfections can be added. He argues from four premises:

(1a) According to Thomas, beatitude is perfect fulfillment.
(1b)“What contributes to anything’s well-being tends toward making its fulfillment perfect.
(1c)“If something contributes to the well-being of perfect fulfillment, it further perfects fulfillment that already is perfect.”
(1d)“But fulfillment that already is perfect cannot be further perfected.”ⁱⁱⁱ

Thus, for Thomas to hold that embodiment and company of friends adds to the well-being of perfect fulfillment is incoherent for it claims that perfect fulfillment can be further perfected. Aside from providing textual support for (1a), Grisez offers no support for the assumptions of the argument.

Argument2: Remaining Desire of the Soul

Grisez agrees with Thomas that the resurrection will add to the well-being of the soul, but thinks this is inconsistent with Aquinas’s conclusion that the ultimate end leaves nothing left to be desired. This argument begins with three premises:

(2a) According to Thomas, the ultimate end leaves nothing more to be desired.
(2b) Separated souls enjoying the beatific have the potential to receive perfections according to their well-being.
(2c) The potential to receive perfection according to well-being is sufficient for desire.

If these are true and the beatific vision is our ultimate end, then a contradiction follows. The disembodied soul enjoying the beatific has nothing left to desire and something left to desire. We have seen that both (2a) and (2b) are held by Thomas, but Grisez implicitly introduces (2c). “So, Thomas rightly holds that resurrection will make for the well-being of the souls that enjoy the beatific vision. But to hold that truth coherently, he would have had to admit that the beatific vision leaves something more to be desired…”^iv A principle at least as strong as (2c) must be operating to make the inference in the second sentence. If Grisez is correct, Thomas’s view of ultimate end is deeply flawed and would require a “complete reconstruction of his treatise on beatitude.”^v Before evaluating these arguments, we will look at the background to the issue in the treatise on happiness.

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i Thomas Aquinas, Purpose and Happiness, vol. 16 (I-II.1-5) of Summa Theologiæ, trans. Thomas Gilby (1968, repr., USA: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

ii Grisez, 49-53. The third argument is an argument from the Catholic Tradition that Thomas’s claims are incompatible with dogmatic claims about heaven. According to Grisez, definitive Catholic teaching holds that bodily life and communion with the blessed are essential to our perfect fulfillment. This, he argues, is directly contrary to Thomas’s view of the beatific as ultimate end. (52-3) The fourth argument will be briefly discussed in a later footnote.

iii Ibid., 50.

iv Ibid.

v Ibid.