Response to Grisez's First Objection

An evaluation of the first argument must begin with a proper understanding of (1a) “According to Thomas, beatitude is perfect fulfillment.” Grisez ignores an important question, Perfect fulfillment of what? Grisez references I-II.1.7 for support where Thomas claims beatitude is perfect fulfillment.ⁱ This article asks Is there one ultimate end for all human beings? In the response, Aquinas answers, “all desire (appetitu) their complete fulfillment, which, as we have noted, is what final end means.” (I-II.1.7) As we have seen, Thomas explains in what our complete fulfillment lies. He is clear that he does not understand “complete fulfillment” to mean that the human being receives every perfection. Rather, he distinguishes what is essential to happiness from what is not, leaving the latter out of what constitutes our ultimate end. Instead, the essence of human happiness is when our highest power is engaged with its highest object. This is found in the intellectual vision of God. So if Thomas thinks our ultimate end is completely fulfilling and that the essence of beatitude lies in the intellectual vision, then he does not think that “complete fulfillment” refers to anything like being perfectly actualized in every potency.

Premise (1d), fulfillment that already is perfect cannot be further perfected, is now the crucial premise. It is true that if a being or capacity is completely actualized or perfected, then it can receive no further perfection in the same respect. But certainly a being that is perfect in one respect can be perfected in another. Thomas thinks that the ultimate end is a complete perfection of the essence of happiness. So Thomas does not violate (1d) as long as he does not claim that other things further contribute to the essence of happiness. And this is exactly what his distinction between types of perfection accomplishes. The added perfections of the resurrection and company of friends are not essential perfections of happiness. Therefore, Grisez’s first argument against Thomas fails, for it fails to recognize the essential-accidental distinction within happiness.

An analogous example will help clarify the point. Recently I attended a cramped chamber orchestra performance of Beethoven’s Violin Concerto. Thirsty and uncomfortable, I was very aware of physical comfort before the orchestra began. But the music completely captured my attention when it started. It is possible to think about the fulfillment of one’s sensible appetites, and in a way, the enrapturing music was the complete fulfillment of the essence of my sensible happiness. While perfections of comfort could have been added to this fulfillment, they would not be constitutive of my enjoyment. My sensible happiness was, in a way, complete, and the other perfections were relegated to accidents.ⁱⁱ

The natural rebuttal to Thomas’s understanding is that although his view of complete fulfillment according to the essence of happiness is compatible with the resurrection and company of friends being accidental, without those things happiness does not seem truly complete because they are so desirable. And this is very near Grisez’s second argument.

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i Grisez, 39.

ii The symphony illustration of essential and accidental happiness is borrowed from Dr. Thomas D’Andrea.