tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-334940982011-09-09T11:10:21.300-04:00Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.comBlogger1081100tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-25482240881952763212011-09-09T11:10:00.000-04:002011-09-09T11:10:21.303-04:00

One of the things I hoped to do with this blog was collect things that either exemplify or make similar points to one of my favorite Chestertonian insights: seeing what is there, the magic of the mundane, the romance of the ordinary. I read Gilead by Marilynne Robinson recently, which was wonderful. This bit, which is from the point of view of an elderly man (like the rest of the book),

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-87174967314019048042011-09-01T20:33:00.000-04:002011-09-01T20:33:27.517-04:00

Two books I read this year made the same argument about selectively trusting the Church for one doctrine while thinking them largely mistaken about other major doctrines. First in his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, John Henry Newman, while speaking of the "sustained and steady march of the sacred science from implicitly belief to formal statement," says, The series of

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-32925389671632074932011-03-23T17:33:00.000-04:002011-03-23T17:33:09.028-04:00

I have been reading some of Kay Ryan’s poetry the last couple of weeks. Anecdotal Evidence introduced me to her work a couple of years ago by quoting her poem, “Things Shouldn’t be so Hard.” Recently, I remembered this poem, which is still my favorite of Ryan’s, when a close friend’s father died and started looking at some of her other work. Now, I know very little about poetry, but have been

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-17970262118971937502009-12-13T11:56:00.002-05:002009-12-13T12:04:17.363-05:00

From man found alive with two legs.

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-55286397228271492312009-07-02T16:19:00.003-04:002009-07-02T16:23:22.563-04:00

No Country for Old Men (2005) and The Road (2006) by Cormac McCarthy.This review has some spoilers for both stories, but not too bad. I wrote it quite a while ago and am posting it to end the embarrassing lack of posting. The review is okay, but I have since read Blood Meridian and have some new thoughts. I'll try to write a review of Meridian soon and comment on how I think No Country and The

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-373437057507625772009-03-05T14:01:00.002-05:002009-03-05T14:04:55.079-05:00

The works cited are at the end.On the internalism/ externalism slide, there is a mistake. "Standard" and "Non-standard" should be switched.I have some notes that go with the presentation but don't show up here. Email me if you want them.

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-90437282765236741612009-01-20T23:03:00.002-05:002009-01-20T23:08:50.259-05:00

My bad for not posting this a lot sooner. For the sake of completing the series, here is the conclusion from my paper._____________We have examined two different arguments against Thomas’s view of ultimate end offered by Germain Grisez. The first argument fails due to the essential-accidental distinction in happiness. In order to understand the context of Grisez’s argument we looked at the

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-76816256071890467922008-12-05T12:22:00.002-05:002008-12-05T12:29:38.866-05:00

Response to (2c)We have seen how Thomas understands (2a) and that he accepts (2b) – separated souls enjoying the beatific have potential to receive perfections according to their well-being. But what does he think of (2c), the potential to receive perfection according to well-being is sufficient for desire? If (2c) holds, then Grisez’s argument is successful and Thomas’s view of ultimate end

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-69108824504638579242008-11-13T19:17:00.002-05:002008-11-13T19:28:28.233-05:00

The Nature and Object of the WillThe appetitive powers are distinct from other powers because they have a unique object, the good. (I.80.1.ad 2) Sensitive appetites pursue goods that are pleasing to the senses (I.81.2), which are concrete particulars. Distinguishing the rational appetite is its object of universal or immaterial goods. (I.81.2.ad 2) Thomas also explains that the object of the will

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-14223123073071800532008-10-28T13:48:00.002-04:002008-10-28T14:08:51.639-04:00

Response to principle (2a)Grisez takes his first premise, (2a) the ultimate end leaves nothing more to be desired, directly from Thomas.i Grisez references question one, article five of the treatise on happiness to support his claim that Thomas holds this principle. Throughout the rest of his article, Grisez then treats this principle without qualifying what is meant by desire. As Grisez

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-29976914350707433302008-10-13T21:22:00.002-04:002008-10-13T21:31:06.058-04:00

An evaluation of the first argument must begin with a proper understanding of (1a) “According to Thomas, beatitude is perfect fulfillment.” Grisez ignores an important question, Perfect fulfillment of what? Grisez references I-II.1.7 for support where Thomas claims beatitude is perfect fulfillment.i This article asks Is there one ultimate end for all human beings? In the response, Aquinas

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-48244739322649084252008-10-08T14:04:00.001-04:002008-10-08T14:18:23.356-04:00

Thomas begins the second part of Summa Theolgiæ with the treatise on happiness or man’s purpose. He starts slowly and builds his case over five questions. We are going to walk through the treatise and explain what is needed to understand the context of Grisez’s objection. The first article of question one asks, Does man act for an end? Thomas argues that a human act is a free act that flows

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-78693075239617256242008-10-03T12:06:00.001-04:002008-10-03T12:23:08.056-04:00

In article five of question four, Thomas asks Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness? He answers no but explains that the body can enter into happiness. Aquinas explains, Note, however, that something may be part of a thing’s perfection in two ways. First, as constituting its nature; thus soul is part of man’s perfection. Secondly, as required for its full development; thus good looks

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-34707326046208382082008-09-16T07:46:00.001-04:002008-09-16T07:52:38.167-04:00

I’ve been reading An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics by Alexander Miller recently and thought I would pass on his explanation of what kinds of questions metaethics is trying to answer:Meaning: what is the semantic function of moral discourse? Is the function of moral discourse to state facts, or does it have some other non fact-stating role? Metaphysics: Do moral facts (or properties)

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-31882524929181124762008-09-09T19:08:00.001-04:002008-09-09T19:11:03.443-04:00

The new natural lawyer and moral theologian Germain Grisez has recently argued against Aquinas’s thesis that God is man’s ultimate end. Grisez takes Thomas’ defense of this thesis in Summa Theologica I-II Q. 1-5 as a foil for the classical theistic tradition. This thesis, “because God constituted us so that we naturally tend toward as close of a union with Him as possible our heart cannot

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-79140267514297120542008-08-25T16:42:00.002-04:002008-08-27T08:52:59.704-04:00

I recently started reading Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard’s Thought by John Lippitt. In the introduction he places SK in the incongruity tradition of humor. Lippit distinguishes logical from factual incongruity and explains Marie Collins Swabey’s fourfold division of the latter from Comic Laughter: A Philosophical Essay. I will explain this division and include some of Lippitt’s examples (

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-5577012618675174622008-08-19T14:24:00.003-04:002008-08-19T14:48:38.109-04:00

Things are finally settling down, so I can do a quick post. Tonight I am presenting chapter thirteen of No One Like Him by John Feinberg. Here are links to the outlines and charts I did for the presentation. This is a bit esoteric, but if you happen to be reading this book, they will help. Also, reference to Craig is this and Stump is this. Real posts coming again soon...Documents are here.

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-45891461325711021822008-07-08T17:51:00.002-04:002008-07-08T17:53:12.243-04:00

Rollins offers another argument against theology as ideology, i.e. that tries to define God. The starting point of his argument will be surprising given what we saw in the last post – theology is no longer a place where we speak of God. Rollins’ argument begins with attributes of God and concludes we cannot do theology as ideology. The argument proceeds from two different angles or

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-41035613123556395042008-06-12T21:43:00.003-04:002008-06-12T21:48:07.573-04:00

This is my current best shot at diagramming Thomas' solution to the vicious circle in practical reason found in par. 1131 of his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-21127571872910112302008-06-11T22:55:00.001-04:002008-06-11T22:57:21.086-04:00

Rollins has some interesting and provocative ways of communicating his theory of God-talk. I’m going to do a series of posts explaining Rollins’ view of God talk and evaluating it. In this first part I’m just going to try to offer an account of his view from the text of How (Not) to Speak of God. Near the beginning of the first chapter Rollins defines an ideology as “any system which is held

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-51971160760737090472008-05-22T14:38:00.003-04:002008-05-22T14:42:25.996-04:00

Instead of going through Peter Rollins’ book How (Not) to Speak of God chapter by chapter, I am going to pick a few different topics to talk about. The first topic is apologetics, which Rollins argues should be abandoned. I am going to offer two readings of his argument and respond to both. Rollins explains that within apologetic discourse legal language is used “to give the impression that

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-2463371269715938522008-05-19T11:16:00.003-04:002008-05-19T11:20:10.206-04:00

I started Peter Rollins’ book How (Not) to Speak of God this weekend. The book is divided two parts. Part one offers the philosophical background to the emergent church movement, and part two explains ten services the author’s emergent worship community has had as examples of what the movement can look like. I will try to post after each chapter – explaining the argument and offering some

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-71494350481221467962008-05-14T10:22:00.002-04:002008-05-14T11:15:59.752-04:00

My summer has finally been decided. I just got accepted to a natural law seminar put on by the Witherspoon Institute at Princeton this summer. Between that and my two classes, my reading is pretty much decided. I will be studying modern philosophy, focusing on Descartes, Spinoza, Locke and Kant. Hopefully I have time to outline/summarize everything. My other class will be a study in

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-66516662323323284592008-05-08T14:52:00.002-04:002008-05-08T14:56:14.057-04:00

Descartes – Discourse on Method. Moral rules derived from method. So as not to remain indecisive in action while working on the method, Descartes adopted a provisional moral code.122 The moral maxims: 1st maxim: Obey the laws and customs of his country and hold to the religion of his childhood. 122 His country as opposed to another since it is the

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-11717734118028888582008-04-29T13:37:00.002-04:002008-04-29T13:43:56.273-04:00

Principle rules of the method. There is not usually so much perfection in works composed of several parts and produced by various different craftsmen as in the works of one man. 116 City metaphor: A city planned by one man is more organized. But it is unreasonable to overturn a city or all of the sciences in order to rebuild it from the ground up. 116-117 But

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-7439961268196703402008-04-28T08:10:00.002-04:002008-04-28T08:11:44.466-04:00

Descartes – Discourse on Method, Chapter 1. Considerations regarding the sciences. Everyone is endowed with good sense or reason to a similar degree, but how each applies it is different. 111 The method allows one to increase his knowledge gradually until the highest point allowed is reached. 112 This is not a normative discourse, but a historical discourse about the

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-47730730205406971582008-04-17T13:15:00.005-04:002008-04-17T13:28:37.018-04:00

I have been listening to a class C. Stephen Evans taught at Regent a couple of years ago (it is excellent). In the final minutes of the class, he introduced this principle:If there is objective truth, there must be a method that guarantees us access to the truth.Evans thinks modern and postmodern philosophers share this principle. But, "one man's Modus Ponens is another's Modus Tollens". So

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-82319448387006740392008-04-16T20:48:00.003-04:002008-04-16T20:52:18.152-04:00

I am speaking this weekend at a conference on faith and reason. Between that and end of semester stuff the blog has suffered. If anyone is feeling disconnected from me, this lecture should help. It is one of my favorites and very related to what I am studying:Peter Kreeft on Lost in the CosmosIf you like this (even if you don't), Kreeft's lecture on Jesus' view of happiness is great too.

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-48260424963186772332008-04-05T09:54:00.006-04:002008-04-08T21:02:44.087-04:00

In Everlasting Man Chesterton says, "We must invoke the most wild and soaring sort of imagination, the imagination that can see what is there." This is one of my favorite insights, and every now and then I'll stumble upon others saying something like it. This morning I found a section in Oliver Twist. Oliver is out in nature performing his daily tasks for the first time after his fear of losing

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-19997407862601162072008-03-26T10:46:00.004-04:002008-04-01T21:53:23.573-04:00

I have been reading Kierkegaard's The Point of View for My Work as An Author: A Report to History the last couple of days and wanted to post a couple of short sections regarding teaching. First, here is some of the undergirding his view of teaching, which is a species of "helping others": That if real success is to attend the effort to bring a man to a definite position, one must first of all

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-27136671669194217252008-03-14T13:23:00.002-04:002008-03-14T13:26:50.990-04:00

In chapter four of Philosophical Fragments, Climacus argues that reason must set itself aside as the person encounters the contradiction, which is the object of faith. These claims have been subject to two schools of interpretation. The first holds that Kierkegaard is an irrationalist and the second holds he is not. The interpretations seem to hinge on whether or not the contradiction is a

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-57824216301214238892008-03-11T16:08:00.003-04:002008-03-11T16:39:56.386-04:00

Concluding Unscientific Postscript: Part One: Chapter One: The Objective Issue of the Truth of Christianity. In the introduction to the Postscript Climacus distinguishes between the subjective and objective issue in Christianity, “The objective issue, then, would be about the truth of Christianity. The subjective issue is about the individual’s relation to Christianity.”1 Part one of the

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-65965911340592179932008-03-07T08:56:00.005-05:002009-02-27T15:41:46.550-05:00

One of my favorite Chesterton quotes is "We must have the most wild and soaring kind of imagination; the imagination that can see what is there." In Orthodoxy, he helps us to see the immensity and magic of the everyday and mundane - another way of saying it is that he helps us to see the poetry of being. Part of this poetry is recognizing the radical contingency of finite things. And we see

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-62793700990145291102008-03-06T09:40:00.001-05:002008-03-06T09:42:23.786-05:00

This is a section of a paper I wrote on heaven as the fulfillment of human nature. I follow the basic goods as enumerated by John Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights. I briefly explain that in heaven we will see God face to face. That should be enough background for the passage below.Play is a surprising category in two ways. First, that it would be thought to be something basic to human

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-60401628006278417582008-02-26T11:57:00.005-05:002008-05-01T12:43:22.033-04:00

In chapter one of Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard offers something of a deduction from the postulate – “the moment has decisive significance.” According to the argument, this entails that the Truth is not possessed and cannot be gained by the learner, but must be given by the God who, in giving the Truth, becomes the savior of the learner who is now the follower. Chapter two has a

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-2805179356417223982008-02-24T18:02:00.001-05:002008-02-24T18:04:33.719-05:00

This is an outline/ summary of the main points of Climacus' argument in chapter one of Philosophical Fragments . Page numbers are to the Hong Princeton editions. References to Evans are from Passionate Reason.The A hypothesis or Socratic view. (9-14) - The truth is not learned but recollected. - The moment does not have significance. - The learner possesses the Truth. - The

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-61881948001769213352008-02-23T14:21:00.003-05:002008-02-23T14:26:20.322-05:00

This is a quote I found while doing research for a paper. It is not offered as a demonstration or a strict argument, but as an insight from someone who I trust as deeply acquainted with what it is to be human,Behold the cramped world of the materialist, wherein beauty is a neural tic, goodness an adaptive feature like a thumb or a tonsil, and the stars no more than tiny sputterings of decay in a

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-30234846871513630772008-02-21T15:55:00.003-05:002008-02-21T15:58:32.530-05:00

I have been reading articles on the debate over the nature of practical reason between the traditional natural law theorists and the Grisez/ Finnis (new natural law theory) theorists. In his article, “The Structures of Practical Reason: Traditional Theories and Contemporary Questions”, Brian V. Johnstone explains a problem Aquinas addresses in his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics.1 In

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-45587144937555409932008-02-19T19:35:00.003-05:002008-02-20T09:28:01.698-05:00

Last night I read Nicolas Wolterstorff's lecture, "Tradition, Insight and Constraint."1 It had been recommended by a couple of people I respect2, and their comments on it piqued my interest. Wolterstorff offers a story about modern philosophy that is much different than the story familiar to me. This post is my attempt to clarify the differences.Wolterstorff begins with some historical context.

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-13333279757002730972008-02-13T15:22:00.001-05:002008-02-13T15:23:08.713-05:00

Greetings from Spring semester 2008. I have my paper and research topics approved, and will try to post as I go on a couple of the topics. I'll list them in order of my posting priority:1. The Thomistic view of practical reason. I am going to be focusing on the discussion between the traditional and new theories of natural law. Hopefully I'll get my research done this semester and be writing

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-8868242771382217072008-02-13T15:16:00.001-05:002008-02-13T15:17:21.670-05:00

At church this past Sunday, I had an unusual after Church conversation. Craig Detweiler, who is a friend of my pastor, was our guest pastor. He heads up the Reel Spirituality division at Fuller Seminary and is traveling to promote his new documentary, Purple State of Mind. There were a couple of viewings in the area, but I didn't have a chance to see it. The title should give you an idea of

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-41772262665092512902008-01-08T15:17:00.000-05:002008-01-08T15:29:26.234-05:00

Below are links to my series on Lessing's Ugly Ditch. Thanks to John Loftus and Cogitator for their comments and help. If anyone wants to check out the final paper, send an email my way.Introduction.It's Actually DitchESThe ApproachExposition of Temporal DitchResponse to Temporal DitchExposition of Metaphysical DitchResponse to Metaphysical DitchSummary of the Distance Thus FarExposition of

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-74202127785009889292008-01-08T15:06:00.000-05:002008-01-08T15:16:01.392-05:00

This paper has attempted to respond to the strongest and most important parts of Lessing’s ditches. If the above arguments are correct, Lessing’s ditch is not a successful de jure objection to Christianity. Obviously this does not prove the truth of Christianity, but it does allow the truth of Christianity to matter. Each ditch also has issues that were not touched in this paper. The

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-12162722880370030262007-12-14T11:14:00.000-05:002007-12-14T11:24:20.120-05:00

If you haven't read Manalive by Chesterton, then the name of this blog won't make any sense. Moreover, if you haven't read Manalive by Chesterton, immediately stop reading and read Manalive. Here is the text, but it is better enjoyed in hand and outside and even better enjoyed read aloud with someone. For the rest of us, here are a few lines from the book:Innocent Smith speaking, "I am going to

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-43454104012848461522007-12-11T15:19:00.000-05:002007-12-11T15:33:31.120-05:00

Here are links to the posts I did on The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins: Introduction Lord, Liar or Lunatic Only Design Omniscience and Omnipotence are Incompatible God's Attributes Dawkins' Master Argument Dawkins' Crucial Premise, Pt. 1 Crucial Premise, Pt. 2 Dawkins' Methodology Five Ways, Pt. 1 Five Ways, Pt. 2 The Courtier's Reply Dawkins' Understanding of Faith

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-64802435616563834172007-12-10T10:30:00.000-05:002007-12-10T10:34:21.089-05:00

This post is the final response to Lessing, for now. It is responding to the ditch explained here. Although P has been placed under the existential ditch for my purposes, the principle really permeates Lessing's entire essay. With that in mind, I do think it is most properly fits under the existential gap due to the commitment aspect of the principle.As a reminder : (P) It is unreasonable for

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-12351799239399150282007-12-10T10:24:00.000-05:002007-12-10T10:35:18.968-05:00

Although Lessing’s three ditches are distinct, they are not entirely separate. So before we consider the existential ditch, we need to summarize the distance of the temporal and metaphysical distances. Then when discussing the existential ditch, part of the existential distance will be the temporal and metaphysical distances. In short, the distance so far seems to be entirely dependent on

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The following is a response to Lessing's metaphysical ditch, which I explained here. Whenever the ditches are discussed, Lessing’s debt to Leibniz and the not too subtle rationalist character of the metaphysical ditch are mentioned.i Instead of diving into a discussion of rationalism and its merits, we will evaluate Lessing’s argument in light of two Christian claims: God became incarnate

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This post begins the response section of my paper. For each response it will be helpful to read my explanation of the respective ditch. The explanation for the temporal ditch is here.Response to the Temporal Ditch. Beginning with the second aspect of the ditch, the problem of historical objectivity has been treated elsewhere, and Loftus does not consider it insoluble.i After explaining William

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The Existential Ditch. The existential ditch is composed of two distinct distances. The first is the problem of appropriating a message that is distant in meaning, relevance, culture, experience and time. Even if the testimony is reliable, how can an individual make such a message their own? This problem is less clear and less powerful than the second, which is a lack of proportionality

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The Metaphysical Ditch.i The metaphysical gap is probably the clearest distance to define; it is exactly the distance between a contingent truth and a necessary truth. Lessing argues that to move from a contingent truth to necessary truths is to commit the fallacy of changing from one genus to another. This is similar to making a category mistake. Matthew Benton calls this the modal aspect of

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The Approach. In approaching responses to Lessing’s ditches, I want to make a distinction between an undercutting defeater and rebutting defeater.i Applying this distinction to responses to alleged defeaters of Christianity, Evans explains that a rebuttal defeater “would show that the alleged defeater does not undermine the belief or that the ground of the belief is not defective. An

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This is the exposition of the temporal ditch as presented by Lessing and Loftus. Comments on the arguments are fine, but I'm even more interested in my presentation being fair and accurate.The Temporal Ditch. Two different issues dig the temporal ditch. The first has to do with the medium of history. Lessing’s argument seems to be: Testimony is the medium of history. The evidential

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This is the rough draft of a section of my paper. Some of it needs to be ironed out a bit, but it should be sufficient for discussion here. As always, criticisms and comments are much appreciated.On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power. In his book, Lessing’s “Ugly Ditch”: a Study of Theology and History, Gordon E. Michalson Jr. argues that there are actually three ditches in Lessing’s essay.

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I am going to be working on a paper this semester on Lessing's Ugly Ditch. The problem is interesting to me and I am curious what Thomistic philosophy has to say about it. Briefly, here is the problem as posed by Lessing and Kierkegaard:If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never

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Over the past few months I have been blogging about The God Delusion, hoping to establish a couple of things about it. First, I have tried to show that Dawkins does not establish his conclusion - that the God hypothesis is in fact a delusion. To do this, I focussed on Dawkins arguments against the existence of God in chapters 3 and 4 of his book. In chapter 3 he responds to positive arguments

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Dawkins spends the later chapters of his book discussing the origin of morality and religion in a Darwinian world. His discussions are interesting and the most persuasive evolutionary accounts I have heard/ read. I have two questions for Dawkins, which he does not address. In fact, he doesn't seem to think they are important.1. Is morality objective? I agree with Dawkins that our inclinations

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Throughout most of The God Delusion, Dawkins implicitly attacks the notion of faith. But at a couple of points, his criticism is sharp and explicit. The first time Dawkins attributes, slightly indirectly, the following claim to religion, "Faith (belief without evidence) is a virtue." (199) Later, he explains the problem, "Faith is an evil precisely because it requires no justification and

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During his discussion (Dawkins reads it in his opening comments) with another Oxford man, historical theology professor Alisterr McGrath, Richard Dawkins approvingly reads 'The Courtier's Reply' by PZ Meyers as a response to some of his critics:I have considered the impudent accusations of Mr Dawkins with exasperation at his lack of serious scholarship. He has apparently not read the detailed

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When I was trying to decide which topics to pursue as posts on this blog, Dawkins' answer to the regress problem in the five ways of Aquinas was one of the first to catch my attention. Since then I have been trying to figure out what Dawkins' argument actually is. I still am not sure, but this is my best shot at examining his response.The first three ways of Aquinas appeal to the impossibility

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In his chapter considering the arguments for God's existence Dawkins looks at the five ways of Aquinas. There are three points I want to make regarding his treatment of Aquinas' arguments: his representation of the argument compared to Aquinas' exposition, whether an unknown physical process can answer St. Thomas' argument and whether a natural terminus could adequately rebut the five ways. I

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One of the issues in Dawkins' book is his methodology. It is clear that he thinks scientific argument is the only rational kind of argument:The theologians of my Cambridge encounter were defining themselves into an epistemological Safe Zone where rational argument could not reach them because they had declared by fiat that it could not. Who was I to say that rational argument was the only

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Dawkins' crucial premise, i.e. an intelligence that can make improbably complex things must be more improbably complex than the things it makes, is denied by classical theism. In fact, classical theism asserts the opposite of God. It claims God, the creator of improbably complex things) is completely simple (not complex, without composition in his being). One argument for this position (

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As he responds to the argument from design, Dawkins says about the argument, "It is indeed a very strong and, I suspect, unanswerable argument - but precisely the opposite direction from the theist's intention. The argument from improbability, properly deployed comes close to proving that God does not exist." (113) Dawkins goes on to critique the standard dichotomy between chance and design.

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Dawkins' spends chapters three and four developing the master argument of his book. The third chapter is spent responding to theistic arguments other than the teleological argument. We will look at some of these in later weeks, but for now it is only important that Dawkins thinks the arguments completely fail. The fourth chapter is spent responding to the argument from design.Dawkins

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After his discussion of the first three ways of Aquinas, he comments,Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing

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After explaining Aquinas' first three ways, Dawkins argues that two of the classical attributes of God, omnipotence and omnipotence, are incompatible.Incidentally, it has not escaped the notice of logicians that omniscience and omnipotence are mutually incompatible. If God is omniscient, he must already know how he is going to intervene to change the course of history using his omnipotence. But

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Dawkins makes a couple of comments about the current use of theistic arguments :The argument from design is the only one still in regular use today, and it still sounds to many like the ultimate knockdown argument. (79)The argument from improbability is the big one. In the traditional guise of the argument from design, it is easily today’s most popular argument offered in favor of the existence

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In Mere Christianity C. S. Lewis argues that Jesus was either Lord, mad or evil. Another way of saying it- Lord, lunatic or liar. In the last paragraph of chapter three of book two he writes, I am trying here to prevent anyone saying the really foolish thing that people often say about Him: 'I'm ready to accept Jesus as a great moral teacher, but I don't accept His claim to be God.' That is

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Over the course of the next few months, I am going to do a series of blogs on The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins. Certainly Dawkins' book has already received a lot of attention. Rebuttals by William Lane Craig, Alvin Plantinga and Alister McGrath have already been given. Craig and Plantinga have given strong critiques of Dawkins' central argument, but it can't hurt for an amateur to give

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From Rhetoric Book 2, the bold numbers are the sections.1. The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. (1) The state of mind a person with the emotion is in. (2) Who the

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Kant opens his section on the transcendental deduction in The Critique of Pure Reason by explaining how jurists distinguish between quid juris, question of right, and quid facti, question of fact. A proof of quid juris is named a deduction. Kant’s goal is to show that we are justified in employing the concepts of the understanding in experience. Because Kant’s proof answers quid juris, it is

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Not every kind of knowledge a priori should be called transcendental,- only knowledge by which we know that and how,-- certain representations (intuitions and concepts) can be employed or are possible a priori.The term transcendental signifies such knowledge that,- concerns the a priori possibility of knowledge,- or the a priori employment of that knowledge.A. Space nore any a priori

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All right, this section is really hard. I'm not going to look at the text for my rough summary. I will add to it, hopefully, as understanding increases. Some of this will invariably be borrowed from Ewing's commentary, since I used it to try to understand.Kant needs a bridge between the pure concepts of the understanding and intuiting. The concepts are heterogenous to objects of experience,

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Special Employment of the Understanding.Contains the rules of correct thinking as regards a certain kind of object.This can be called an organon of this or that science.General: Logic of Elements.Contatins the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment of the understanding.It treats the udnerstanding without any regard for the differences in objects to which

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Reason doesn't generate any concept. but it, at most, can free a concept of understanding from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience and try to extend it beyond the limits of empirical though still related to empirical. This is how it happens: for a given conditioned, reason demands, on the side of the conditions, absolute totality. the

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Note: This isn't the entire entry for "understanding". Also, this is not an exact quote.The understanding secures the "unity of appearances by means of rules" while reason pursues the "unity of the rules of understanding under principles." (CPR A302/ B359)While the understanding is restricted to the range of possible experience, reason is "directed always towards absolute totality in the

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Condition [bedingung] see also absolute, accident, appearance, causality, dialectic, experience, intuition, space, succession, time. Appearances are conditioned by space and time, while judgments are conditioned by ‘the unification of given representations in a consiousness’. Together they form the conditions for objects of possible experience, and the knowledge of such objects. Reason,

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§ 2 Metaphysical Exposition of this Concept."By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an

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ReviewIntroductionChapter 1 - Methodical RealismChapter 2 - Realism and MethodChapter 3 - The Specific Nature of the Philosophic OrderChapter 4 - The Realist MethodChapter 5 - The Realist Beginner's Handbook

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Series:The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins. Lessing's Ugly Ditch.Classes: Kant.

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What are analytic and synthetic judgments as understood by Kant? How does geometry fit into this division? In comparison to his predecessors, Kant’s understanding of the division between analytic and synthetic judgments is both familiar and revolutionary. It is familiar because the division is between the same kinds of judgments. It is revolutionary because of where certain kinds of

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(Note: Parts of this lecture are almost exactly from the handout or slides. So, to give credit where credit is due, I have put (H/O) around those sections. Quotes from Kant are close, but some paraphrasing probably occurred. This post is pretty much the notes I took from the lecture. I cleaned them up and organized them a bit though.)Judgments, Concepts, Representations, Experience,

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The success of math moves us to expect similar success in other fields, in fact, math's success promotes utilizing its method in other areas. We must examine whether the method can be used in philosophy."Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts (from later:The consideration of everything which exists in space or time regarding the questions of its existence, "

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This chart is from page 267 in Ewing's book.

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"How is nature itself possible? This question - the highest point that transcendental philosophy can ever reach, and to which, as its boundary and completion, it must proceed - properly contains two questions.1. How is nature possible in general in the material sense? It is possible by means of the constitution of our sensibility. Sensibility is affected by objects which are totally unknown to

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§18. Each perception must be subsumed by a priori concepts of the understanding to be changed into experience. A judgment of experience is an empirical judgment that has objective validity. An empirical judgment with only subjective validity is a judgment of perception. The former requires concepts originated in the understanding in addition to sensuous intuition to make the subjective

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Part 4 - Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories, as Knowledge a priori"When we speak of different experiences, we can refer only to the various perceptions, all of which, as such, belong to one and the same general experience. This thoroughgoing synthetic unity of perceptions is indeed the form of experience; it is nothing else than the synthetic unity of appearances in

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Only through a priori forms can an object appear to us in objective experience. Two of these a priori forms, space and time, are pure forms of sensibility. "The categories of understanding, on the other hand, do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition." It is not necessary then, for objects to appear to us under the conditions of the understanding. This poses

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"A logical paralogism is a syllogism which is fallacious in form, be its content what it may. A transcendental paralogism is one in which there is a transcendental ground, constraining us to draw a formally invalid conclusion. Such a fallacy is therefore grounded in the nature of human reason, and gives rise to an illusion which cannot be avoided, although it may, indeed, be rendered harmless."

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This section is just after the three analogies of experience. "By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws." Some of theses laws, a priori laws, make nature possible. In experience, empirical laws can be discovered only because of the original laws which make experience

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"Now in the whole domain of pure reason, in its merely speculative employment, there is not to be found a single synthetic judgment directly derived from concepts. For, as we have shown, ideas cannot form the basis of any objectively valid synthetic judgment." But by relating concepts to possible experience pure reason does establish secure principles. Only by presupposing the experiences in

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The paradox of metaphysics: Metaphysics claims to be the queen of the sciences because of its content and the certainty it delivered, but it fails to deliver on either of these claims. Instead, there is a conflict within metaphysics between the rationalists (e.g. Leibniz, Wolff) and the empiricists (e.g. Newton, Hume). The conflict is not new and doesn't have an end in sight. It seems we

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"The proposition that no predicate contradictory of a thin can belong to it, is entitled the principle of contradiction, and is a universal, though merely negative, criterion of all truth. For this reason it belongs only to logic. It holds of knowledge, merely as knowledge in general, irrespective of content; and asserts that the contradiction completely cancels and invalidates it." In regard

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Note: The sections of the Prolegomena explain things a little differently, but have almost the same content here. By way of introduction to this material Kant explains some things that can be found in the prefaces to the Critique.1. The Distinction Between Pure and Empirical Knowledge"There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience." Without the objects of our senses, we

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-1158266140706161532006-09-14T15:55:00.000-04:002006-09-14T16:35:40.866-04:00

This is a helpful section. Kant explains a lot of terms he has been using. He explains what things are in paragraph form, but I'm going to do it in dictionary form.Intuition - that through which whatever means of a mode of knowledge is related to objects by any means; to which all thought as means is directed. Intuition is only possible when the mind is affected by objects.Sensibility - that

Brandon Dahmhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11205795932450490112noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33494098.post-1158181915149093902006-09-13T15:26:00.000-04:002006-09-15T11:32:55.133-04:00

When we abstract from the matter of judgments and consider only their form as moments of judgment, we get the following table: I. Quantity of Judgments universal particular singular II.

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"By the polemical employment of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions as against the dogmatic counter-propositions through which they are denied. Here the contention is not that its own assertions may not, perhaps, be false, but only that no one can assert the opposite with apodeictic certainty, or even, indeed, with a greater degree of likelihood."Some cases of conflict within pure

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The CritiqueI. The Critical ProblemA. Critique as a Tribunal for Diputes of Pure Reason : K1 7-15, 593-605B. History of Successful and Failed Sciences : K1 17-27C. Judgments:1. Theoretical : K1 106-110, 43-55, 190, P § 1-3, 18-202. Practical : (See Critique of Practical Reason, I.1.1)3. Aesthetic : (See Critique of Judgment, § 7 : 53-56 )D. The Critial ProblemII. The Critical SolutionA.

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The lecture covered an in class handout, which is most of what follows. We did an overview of the distinctions Kant makes between judgments. It was noted that this division is logico-semantic and not metaphysical or epistemological.Analytic Judgment : a judgment in which the predicate (B) is contained in the concept of the subject (A). A judgment whose denial implies a contradiction.Synthetic

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